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RECENT CASES
the fairness of "custodial interrogation," since minority group members are
often victims of police abuse. This position thus leads to the conclusion
that only a mechanical rule, similar to the one proposed by the dissenters,
can give any real meaning to fifth and sixth amendment rights.
The elements of truth which exist in both positions does not make
reconciliation impossible, but rather groping and difficult. Depriving law
enforcement officials of a valuable tool of investigation is likely to have
untoward effects, while maintaining the pretense of rights which are un-
enforceable makes a mockery of the law. Unwilling, therefore, to surrender
law and order for liberty and law, the solution to the problem must rest
on the ground of delicate adjustment,3 9 refinement, and continuous evalua-
tion of the actual effects of the new rules devised.
BERNARD M. BRODSKY
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN
PAROLE REVOCATION HEARING
In 1947, a relator was convicted on a plea of guilty to a charge of
murder in the second degree in the court of general sessions and was sen-
tenced to prison for a term of from tweny years to life. He was paroled
in the summer of 1963 after having served sixteen years. In December of
1964 he was declared "delinquent" and subsequently taken into custody
in March of 1965, charged with having violated the conditions of his parole
by consorting with criminals and giving false information to his parole
supervisor. The relator admitted these charges in a revocation hearing held
before a parole court at which he was not represented by counsel. His
parole was then revoked and the board ordered him barred from parole
reconsideration for at least two years. In three subsequent appearances
before the board held for the purpose of determining eligibility for parole
release, the relator appeared without counsel and was denied release, ap-
parently on the basis of his initial violation. He -then brought an action to
redress the deprivation of asserted constitutional rights to counsel and other
procedural safeguards. The proceeding was dismissed on the ground that it
39. Because of the need foii delicate adjustment, this writer is forqed to reject
the dissenters' rule. While this position does end the problem of the trustworthiness of
a waiver, this is done without first determining whether some less drastic remedy would
.secure the desired measure of rights, without hobbling law enforcement efficiency. If
modest remedies fail, then a choice between competing considerations may be neces-
saxy; but until such time it is incumbent upon courts and legislators to make sincere
and imaginative efforts to create practices which will guarantee the reality of fifth and
sixth amendment safeguards.
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had been commenced beyond the time permitted by statute.' Following that
dismissal, the relator brought the present habeas corpus proceeding alleging
denial of due process at the parole revocation hearing. Special term dis.
missed the petition and he appealed directly to the Court of Appeals. 2
Held, three judges dissenting, that the relator had a constitutional right
under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to representa.
-tion by counsel and to presentation of testimony at a parole revocation
proceeding resulting in the deprivation of liberty. People ex rel. Mene-
chino v. Warden, Greenhaven State Prison, 27 N.Y.2d 376, 267 N.E.2d 238,
318 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1971).
The right to assistance of counsel in criminal prosecutions has been
recognized by the Supreme Court to be necessary to insure a fair hearing.
This right was extended to indigents charged with serious crimes in state
courts in Gideon v. Wainwright,4 and to other stages of the criminal pro-
ceedings where rights of the accused could be substantially affected.5 The
right to counsel has not been limited to criminal proceedings but has been
held applicable in areas where governmental action substantially affects
an individual's right to liberty regardless of the label applied to such pro-
ceedings." There has been, however, no general constitutional, right to
counsel in parole revocation hearings.7 The reason for distinguishing the
1. See Menechino v. Division of Parole, 26 N.Y.2d 837, 258 N.E2.d 84, 309 N.YS.2d
585 (1970), af'g 32 App. Div. 2d 761, 301 N.Y.S.2d 350 (1st Dep't 1969), rev'g 57
Misc. 2d 865, 293 N.Y.S.2d 741 (Sup. Ct. 1968).
2. N.Y. Crv. PRAc. § 5601 (b) (1) (McKinney 1963).
3. Powell v. Alabama, 287 US. 45 (1932). "The right to be heard would be, In
many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel."
Id. at 68-69.
4. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
5. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961) (certain arraignments);
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (appeal of right); Massiah v. United States,
377 U.S. 201 (1964) (covert interrogation of indicted suspect); Escobedo v. Illinois,
378 U.S. 478 (1964) (pretrial interrogation); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)(same); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (identification line up); Mempha v.
Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967) (probation revocation).
6. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
7. In federal court actions state prisoners whose parole has begn revoked have
been held to have no federally protected constitutional right to counsel in a parole
revocation proceeding. Martinez v. Patterson, 429 F.2d 844 (10th Cir. 1970); Dunn v.
California Dep't of Corrections, 401 F.2d 340 (9th Cir. 1968); Williams v. Patterson,
389 F.2d 374 (10th Cir. 1968); Williams v. Dunbar, 377 F.2d 505 (9th Cir.), cert. denled,
389 U.S. 866 (1967); Gonzales v. Patterson, 370 F.2d 94 (10th Cir. 1966). Federal
prisoners likewise have no federal constitutional right to counsel in parole revocation
proceedings before the United States Parole Board. Moore v. Reid, 246 F.2d 654 (D.C.
Cir. 1957). Prisoners under the District of Columbia Parole Board jurisdiction also have
no constitutional right to counsel. Fleming v. Tate, 156 F.2d 848 (D.C. Cir. 1946).
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"liberty" of parolees from that of welfare recipients in Goldberg v. Kelly 8
is not clear. The distinction is often based on the right-privilege differen-
tiation promulgated in Escoe v. Zerbst9 although the viability of Escoe is
questionable following the Supreme Court decision in Mempha v. Rhay.o
It has repeatedly been held that a presently enjoyed interest is protected
by procedural due process, 1 but apparently a parolee has had no right to
continued liberty as he has been considered as merely enjoying the benefits
of an act of mercy from the sovereign.' 2 One writer has responded to this
argument by pointing out that parole is not a personal act of grace from
a monarch but
a highly institutionalized system administered to tens of thousands
of offenders each year by hundreds of governmental officials. So
administered in a democratic community, even grace itself, it may
be thought, must be dispensed and withdrawn according to some
sense of principle and order and with some respect for the forms
of procedural regularity associated with concepts of basic fairness.
But more significantly, the institution of individualized treatment
represented by the indeterminate sentence laws and the system of
probation and parole are not remotely charity, but an integral
part of our system of criminal law.' 3
Another argument for denying parolees the rights enjoyed by holders
ot other privileges is that the parolee remains in the custody of the warden
and therefore the status of the parole violator is analogous to that of an
escapee who is susceptible to reincarceration without due process protec-
tions. The fundamental problem with this argument is that it assumes
Similarly state courts have held that there is no right to counsel under due process in
parole revocation proceedings. Pope v. Superior Court of Solano County, 9 Cal. App.
3d 636, 88 Cal. Rptr. 483 (1970); Johnson v. Stucker, 203 Kan. 253, 453 P,2d 35, cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 904 (1969); In re Spurlock, 153 Mont. 475, 458 P.2d 80 (1969);
Robinson v. Cox, 77 N.M. 55, 419 P.2d 253 (1966); Menechino v. Division of Parole, 32
App. Div. 2d 791, 301 N.Y.S.2d 350 (Ist Dep't 1969), affd, 26 N.Y.2d 837, 309 N.Y.S.2d 585
(1970); People ex rel. Smith v. Deegan, 32 App. Div. 2d 940, 303 N.Y.S.2d 789 (2d Dep't
1969) (Both New York cases have, in effect, been overruled by the instant case); State
ex rel. Gilmore v. Cupp, 458 P.2d 711 (Ore. App. 1969). But see Commonwealth v.
Tinson, 433 Pa. 328, 249 A.2d 549 (1969).
8. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
9. 295 U.S. 490 (1935).
10. 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
11. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (welfare benefits); In re Ruffalo, 390
U.S. 544 (1968) (disbarment); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (adjudication as ajuvenile delinquent); Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959) (employment); Long
May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185 (1958); Joint Anti-Fascist Refuge Committee v. McGrath,
341 U.S. 123 (1951).
12. Kadish, The Advocate and the Expert-Counsel in the Peno-Correctional
Process, 45 MINN. L. REV. 803, 826 (1961).
13. Id. at 826-27. See also Menechino v. Oswald, 430 F.2d 403, 409 (2d Cir. 1970).
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
that there has been a violation and this is the precise question on which
procedural due process guarantees are demanded.14
In Hyser v. Reed,15 the existence of a constitutional right to counsel
in parole revocation proceedings was denied on the rationale that the pa-
role board acts as parens patriae of the parolee and therefore due process
protections are unnecessary.16 However, a similar argument made four
years later before the Supreme Court in the case of a proceeding to ad-
judicate juvenile delinquency was rejected.' 7 Insofar as a parole revocation
proceeding is dispositional, the parens patriae argument may be valid
since, theoretically, both the board and the parolee are interested in the
well-being of the parolee and of society. Nonetheless, where there is a
factual dispute, the hearing is, of necessity, adversarial. The factual dis-
pute must be resolved before the discretionary dispositional assessment can
be made. Regardless of whether the proceeding is labelled discretionary,
due process considerations must be complied with.'8
Despite the almost uniform insistence of the absence of a constitutional
right to counsel at parole revocation hearings,'0 many jurisdictions have
provided for counsel at such proceedings either by statute20 or by judicial
14. Note, 65 HARv. L. REv. 309, 311 (1951). See also Rose v. Haskins, 888 F.2d
91 (6th Cir. 1968) (dissenting opinion).
15. 318 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, Jamison v. Chappell, 375 U.S. 957 (1963).
16. See Note, 18 BvFFALO L. REV. 607, 609-10 (1968). The Hyser decision may
be a significant indicator of the direction the Supreme Court may take in this area. Mr.
Chief Justice (then Judge) Warren Burger wrote the majority opinion in that case.
17. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 26 (1967).
18. Id. Cf. Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967); Kent v. United States, 383
U.S. 541 (1966); Baxtrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966). In the early history of parole,
lack of due process was justified since "[i]n pratically every instance, the hearing on
a parole violation is merely a formality to permit the returned violator to give his
version of the events which led up to the revocation of his parole. As far as the parole
authorities are concerned, the facts justifying the revocation of the parole almost
invariably are dearly established before the time of (or concurrent with) the return
of the offender to the institution." 4 ATtORNEY GENERAL SURVEY OF RELEASE PROCEDURES
246 (1989).
19. See supra cases cited note 7.
20. For example, since 1962, the United States Parole Board grants such a right
under 28 C.F.R. § 2.41 which provides:
Each alleged parole or mandatory release violator shall be advised that he
may be represented by counsel and that voluntary witnesses who have informa-
tion relevant and material may testify at the preliminary interview or the
revocation hearing, or both, auth~orized by § 2.40; Provided, that the alleged
violator arranges for the appearance of counsel and witnesses in accordance
with procedures prescribed by the Board.
See also, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 77-541 (Supp. 1970); MxcH. CoinP. LAws ANN. §§
791.234 (1958), 791.244 (1953); MONT. REv. CODE § 94-9835 (1955); TEx. CODE CIM. PROC.
art. 42.12 § 18 (1966). See also Kadish, supra note 12, at 824 n.101; Sklar, Law and Prac-
tice in Probation and Parole Revocation Hearings, 55 J. Cams. L.C. & P.S. 175, 181
(1964).
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interpretation.21 In Fleming v. Tate22 the Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia, although holding that there is no constitutional right
to counsel in a parole revocation hearing, found that a right to counsel
must be inferred from the nature of parole.23
The parole system is an enlightened effort on the part of society
to rehabilitate convicted criminals. Certainly no circumstance
could further that purpose to a greater extent than a firm belief
on the part of such offenders in the impartial, unhurried, objec-
tive and thorough processes of the machinery of the law. And
hardly any circumstance could with greater effect impede the
progress towards the desired end than a belief on their part that
the machinery of the law is arbitrary, technical, too busy or im-
pervious to the facts.2 4
The court then interpreted the statutory "opportunity to appear" before
the Parole Board to mean an effective appearance thus necessitating the
presence of counsel if the prisoner so elects.25
In most jurisdictions where the right to be represented by counsel has
been accepted, it has not been extended to require appointment of counsel
for indigents. The question of whether a parolee is entitled to be repre-
sented by counsel is distinguished from the question of whether an indigent
parolee is entitled to have counsel assigned to represent him at such a
hearing.2 6 In Hyser, the court, having held that the parole revocation pro-
ceeding was not a criminal prosecution, declared -that sixth amendment
21. In the following cases, statutory language providing for an "opportunity to
appear" has been held to implicitly provide for the right to counsel: Barnes v. Reed,
301 F.2d 516 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Reed v. Butterworth, 297 F.2d 776 (D.C. Cir. 1961);
Glen v. Reed, 289 F.2d 462 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Hurley v. Reed, 288 F.2d 844 (D.C. Cir.
1961); Robbins v. Reed, 269 F.2d 242 (D.C. Cir. 1959); Moore v. Reid, 246 F.2d 654
(D.C. Cir. 1957); Fleming v. Tate, 156 F.2d 848 (D.C. Cir. 1946); United States ex rel.
Obler v. Kenton, 262 F. Supp. 205 (D. Conn. 1967); State v. Boggs, 49 Del. 277, 114
A.2d 663 (1955); Warden v. Palumbo, 214 Md. 407, 135 A.2d 439 (1957). But see Wash-
ington v. Hagan, 287 F.2d 332 (3d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 970 (1961) ; Hiatt v.
Compagna, 178 F.2d 42 (5th Cir. 1949), aff'd by an equally divided court, 340 U.S.
408 (1950); Gibson v. Markley, 205 F. Supp. 742 (S.D. Ind. 1962); Poole v. Stevens,
190 F. Supp. 938 (E.D. Mich. 1960); Hock v. Hagan, 190 F. Supp. 749 (M.D. Pa.
1960); U.S. ex rel. McCreany v. Kenton, 190 F. Supp. 689 (D. Conn. 1960); Lopez v.
Madigan, 174 F. Supp. 919 (N.D. Cal. 1959). In probation revocation proceedings under
New York's Code of Criminal Procedure section 935 similar language has been like-
wise held to require not only that the probationer be given the right to have counsel
present but also that he be informed of such right. People v. Hamilton, 26 App. Div.
2d 134, 271 N.Y.S.2d 694 (4th Dep't 1966).
22. 156 F.2d 848 (D.C. Cir. 1946).
23. Id. at 849.
24. Id. at 850.
25. Id. at 849.
26. Martin v. United States Bd. of Parole, 199 F. Supp. 542 (D.D.C. 1961).
717
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guarantees were inapplicable 27 Thus, although the right to retained coun-
sel was acknowledged, the right to appointed counsel was not.28 It was
reasoned in Jones v. Riversn9 that:
When a person accused of crime has been tried, defended, sen-
tenced and, if he wishes, has exhausted his rights of appeal, the
period of contentious litigation is over. The problem then be-
comes one of an attempt at rehabilitation and the progress of that
attempt should be measured, not by legal rules, but by the con-
sidered judgment of those who make it their professional business.
So long as that judgment is fairly and honestly exercised, a judg-
ment which is subject to judicial review, we think there is no
place for required counsel representation in the matter of parole
revocation. In short, it is illogical to equate parole processes with
criminal prosecution and we conclude that due process does not
require that indigent parolees be provided with counsel when
they appear before the Parole Board....3 0
The incongruity of granting the right to retained counsel as a neces-
sary safeguard to a fair hearing while denying this safeguard to indigents
was pointed up in separate concurrences in both Jones and Hyser.3 1 More
recently, in Earnest v. Willingham.A the court said: "Where liberty is at
stake a State may not grant to one even a non-constitutional, statutory
right such as here involved and deny it to another because of poverty."83
A few states have by statute granted the right of assigned counsel in parole
27. 318 F.2d 225, 237 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
28. Id. See also Martinez v. Patterson, 429 F.2d 844 (10th Cir. 1970); Boddie v.
Weakley, 356 F.2d 242 (4th Cir. 1966); Gaskins v. Kennedy, 250 F.2d 311 (4th Cir.
1965); Hodge v. Maxkley, 339 F.2d 973 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 927 (1965);
Jones v. Rivers, 338 F.2d 862 (4th Cir. 1964); United States ex rel. Bradshaw v.
Parker, 307 F. Supp. 451 (M.D. Pa. 1969); Lawson v. Coiner, 291 F. Supp. 79 (N.D.
W. Va. 1968); Holder v. United States, 285 F. Supp. 380 (E.D. Tex. 1968); United
States ex rel. Obler v. Kenton, 262 F. Supp. 205 (D. Conn 1967); Lavendera v. Taylor,
234 F. Supp. 703 (D. Kansas), aff'd, 347 F.2d 989 (10th Cir. 1964); Martin v. United
States Bd. of Parole, 199 F. Supp. 542 (D.D.C. 1961); Johnson v. Wainwright, 208 So.
2d 505 (Fla. App. 1968); Robinson v. Cox, 77 N.M. 55, 419 P.2d 253 (1966); Riggins
v. Rhay, 75 Wash. 2d 271, 450 P.2d 806 (1969).
29. 338 F.2d 862 (4th Cir. 1964).
30. Id. at 874.
31. [Were we to construe the statutory grant of right to counsel as intended
only for those who can pay, substantial constitutional questions would
arise. ... Poverty bears no more relationship to the question of parole
violation than to the question of guilt. Therefore congressional discrimina-
tion against parolees who cannot afford counsel would raise serious prob-
lems of due process of law.
318 F.2d 225, 255 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (concurring opinion). See also Jones v. Rivers, 338
F.2d 862, 876 (4th Cir. 1964) (Sobeloff J., concurring specially).
32. 406 F.2d 681 (10th Cir. 1969).
33. Id. at 683-84. See also Menechino v. Oswald, 430 F.2d 403, 410 (2d Cir. 1970).
See generally Perry v. Willard, 247 Ore. 145, 427 P.2d 1020 (1967).
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revocation proceedings to indigents,3 4 and several correctional studies have
recommended such a practice3 5
Recently, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in Commonwealth v.
Tinson,36 held that a parolee has a constitutional right to counsel in a
parole revocation hearing. In reaching its decision, the court noted the
absence of significant difference between a probation revocation proceed-
ing, where counsel is constitutionally required under Mempha v. Rhay
and McConnell v. Rhay,37 and a proceeding to revoke parole. Prior to the
decision in the instant case, no New York court had recognized the exist-
ence of such a federal constitutional right. A New York supreme court
decision on the issue had held that a parolee was not entitled to consti-
tutional due process because parole revocation is not a criminal prosecution
within the meaning of the sixth amendment guarantee.3 8 In People ex rel.
Combs v. LaVallee,3 9 however, the Appellate Division for the Fourth De-
partment held that a parolee is entitled to counsel and due process at a
proceeding to revoke parole under the New York Constitution, article I,
section 6, which guarantees right to counsel "in any trial in any court."40
This constitutional provision was applied to section 218 of the Correction
La'v which required the Board to "hold a parole court,"41 and the court
declared:
When all the legal niceties are laid aside a proceeding to revoke
parole involves the right of an individual to continue at liberty
just as much as did the original criminal action and, it is sub-
mitted, falls within the due process provision of Section 6 of
Article I of our State Constitution.42
The Combs decision was followed in People ex rel. Ochs v. LaValle43 where
a new revocation hearing with counsel and due process was ordered. The
34. See, e.g., P. R. LAws ANN. tit. 4, § 646 (1965). Appointment of counsel is not
required but is provided for in Maryland and West Virginia. Kadish, supra note 12,
at 826-27, citing, PRocEmNGs OF THE 89m ANNUAL CONGRESS OF CORRECTIONS OF THE
AMERICAN CORRECTIONAL Ass'N WORKSHOP V, COMM. ON PAROLE BD. PROBLEMS 83-84 (1959).
35. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAw" ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SocIETY 368 (1968); A.B.A. PRojtar ON MINIMUM
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE-STANDARDS RELATING TO PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES
43 (1967); ATTORNEY GENERAie" COMM. ON POVERTY AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF FEDERAL
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, REPORT 49 (1963).
36. 433 Pa. 328, 249 A.2d 549 (1969).
37. 393 U.S. 2 (1968).
38. People ex rel. Turner v. Deegan, 55 Misc. 2d 261, 285 N.Y.S.2d 253 (Sup. Ct.
1967).
39. 29 App. Div. 2d 128, 286 N.Y.S.2d 600 (4th Dep't), appeal dismissed, 22 N.Y.2d
857, 293 N.Y.S.2d 117 (1968).
40. Id. at 131, 286 N.Y.S.2d at 603.
41. Id.
42. Id.
- 43. 60 Misc. 2d 627, 303 N.Y.S.2d 772 (Sup. Ct. 1968).
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Parole Board failed to comply with the order in several respects and the
case went back to the Clinton County Supreme Court.4 4 The court, noting
that the Court of Appeals had in the intervening period declared that a
revocation hearing was not an adversary proceeding requiring counsel, 40
modified its prior opinion to conform to the Court of Appeals' statement
and dismissed the petition.46 The New York Legislature responded to the
Combs decision by deleting the word "court" from section 218 of the Cor-
rection Law,47 and the present statutory proscription of the right to coun-
sel at parole revocation 48 has been held not to violate any constitutional
provision.4 9
In the instant case, the Court of'Appeals relied on the principle articu-
lated by the Supreme Court in Mempha in reaching the decision that the
right to counsel in parole revocation proceedings is constitutionally man-
dated. Since a proceeding to revoke parole involves a factual determination
of a violation of the condition of release just as much as does a probation
revocation proceeding, the rule applicable to the latter should be equally
essential in the former. Relying on Combs' language 0 the court refused
to be diverted by labels into drawing the distinction between judicial and
administrative proceeding and instead, weighed the consequences of each
action.l The court noted that the revocation decision could condemn the
relator to imprisonment for life.52 Considering these grave consequences,
the court reasoned, the Board could not be permitted to act on possibly
mistaken information either due to inaccurate reports or due to the pa-
rolee's inability to present a coherent defense. Noting that the sixth
amendment could no longer be narrowly limited to "criminal prosecu-
tions," the court proceeded to argue that the presence of counsel at the
revocation hearing would insure the accuracy of the factual determination
on which the decision to revoke was to be based. 53 The court then at-
tempted to restrict the scope of its holding to "assure, to the board as well
as to the parolee, that the board is, insofar as the parolee is concerned,
44. 60 Misc. 2d 629, 303 N.Y.S.2d 774 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
45. Briguglio v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 24 N.Y.2d 21, 246 N.E.2d 512,
298 N.Y.S.2d 704 (1969) (dictum).
46. 60 Misc. 2d 629, 303 N.Y.S.2d 774 (Sup. Ct.), af'd, 33 App. Div. 2d 80, 807
N.Y.S.2d 982 (3d Dep't 1969).
47. N.Y. Sess. Laws, ch. 203, July 9, 1968.
48. N.Y. Coa. LAw § 218 (McKinney 1968) provides in part that a parole violator
shall have "an opportunity to appear personally, but not through counsel or others,
before three members of such board of parole and explain the charges made against
him."
49. See, e.g., People ex rel. Brock v. LaVallee, 33 App. Div. 2d 722, 307 N.Y.S.2d
981 (3d Dep't 1969).
50. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
51. 27 N.Y.2d 376, 382, 267 N.E.2d 238, 241, 318 N.Y.S.2d 449, 453 (1971).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 382-83, 267 N.E.2d at 241-42, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 454.
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accurately informed of the facts before it acts." 54 The contention that pa-
role was a privilege whose enjoyment could be terminated without any
constitutional guarantees was squarely rejected by the court. Instead, it
accepted the argument that the right to a revocation hearing, once granted
to the parolee, implies compliance with constitutional requirements.55 The
majority, citing the experience in other jurisdictions, pointed out that
providing counsel to parolees would have no adverse impact on the parole
system.56
The dissent, per Judge Scileppi, disagreed, contending that the pres-
ence of counsel would result in "undue delays and procedural difficulties
which already plague the administration of criminal justice."57 While in-
dicating that the right to counsel at parole revocation proceedings might
be desirable if promulgated by a legislative body, 'the dissent insisted 'that
it was not constitutionally required.58 The argument by the majority that
parole revocation results in a loss of liberty was strongly rejected. Since
the parolee was already in custody, notions of preconviction liberty were
held to be inapposite and the parole violator was therefore subject to re-
incarceration at any time without the protection of due process rights ap-
plicable prior to conviction.59 The dissent also rejected the court's reliance
on Mempha, arguing that Mempha was a "sentencing case," where the
probationer, unlike the parolee here, was subject to an increased sentence.6 0
Agreeing with Judge Scileppi that although counsel at revocation
hearings may be desirable without being constitutionally required, Judge
Breitel's dissent focused on the impact of the court's decision. The at-
tempted limitation on the right granted by the court, noted this dissent,
would prove to be evanescent and would inevitably convert the revocation
hearing into a trial-type proceeding.61 The decision would compound the
difficulty thus created by generating several concomitant rights-assignment
of counsel (probably creating a need for a prosecuting attorney as well),
review (thus necessitating the maintenance of a record and the formulation
of a measurable standard of proof), and probably new post-conviction
54. Id. at 383, 267 N.E.2d at 242, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 455.
55. Id. at 884, 267 N.E.2d at 242, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 455.
56. Id. at 385, 267 N.E2d at 243, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 456. It should be noted, however,
that both articles cited by the court (Sklar, supra note 20 and Kadish, supra note 12)
antedated Gideon and other Supreme Court decisions extending the indigent's right to
counsel to various stages of the proceedings. Granting the right to counsel prior to
these decisions would not necessarily have the same impact as doing so at present when
the doctrinal development in the area of indigent's right to counsel is more complete.
57. Id. at 392, 267 N.E.2d at 247, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 462 (Scileppi J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 393, 267 N.E.2d at 248, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 463 (Scileppi J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 390-91, 267 N.E.2d at 247, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 461 (Scileppi J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 390-91, 267 N.E.2d at 246-47, 318 N.Y.S.2nd at 460-61 (Scileppi J., dis-
senting).
61. Id. at 394, 267 N.E.2d at 249, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 464 (Breitel J., dissenting).
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proceedings. 62 Furthermore, the decision would have to be held retroactive
thus aggravating all the other practical problems created.63 Had the court
deferred to the legislature, it would have given that body a greater degree
of flexibility necessary to make the implementation transition a smooth
one.64
As noted by Judge Breitel's dissent, the court's attempted limitation
of its holding appears to be ineffective. For example, the court declares
that counsel should be permitted to question the accuracy of the parole
supervisor's report.65 Parole reports often contain hearsay statements,6 0
and the accuracy of the reports could not effectively be questioned unless
the declarant were available for questioning and possible impeachment.
Producing the declarant in court may not be an easy task although
the Parole Board has the power of compulsory process0 7 since the witness
will more than likely be reluctant to confront the parolee. A potential
informant faced with the possibility of having his identity disclosed may
well decide to withhold his information. This would be especially true in
the frequent case where the informant is a family member or close friend
who imparts information under assurances of confidentiality.68 Granting
such informants a privilege from testifying seems incompatible with no-
tions of due process and would be especially ironic since the right to coun-
sel has been granted to insure a more reliable fact-finding process. 9 An
informant secure in the knowledge that he is free from the compulsion
to testify and free from the risk of discovery may be invited to lie without
fear of contradiction. Malicious misinformation is likely where the in-
formant bears a grudge against the parolee. Unless the identity of the
informant is disclosed, proper impeachment of words in cold print may
be impossible.70 Furthermore, parole officers have been known to have
62. Id. at 394-95, 267 N.E.2d at 249-50, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 464-65 (Breitel J., dissent-
ing).
63. Id. at 395, 267 NXE.2d at 250, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 465 (Breitel J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 393, 267 N.E2.d at 248, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 463 (Breitel J., dissenting).
65. Id. at 382-83, 267 N.E.2d at 241-42, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 454.
66. See note 68 infra and accompanying text.
67. N.Y. CoRR. LAw § 6-a (5) (McKinney Supp. 1970).
68. Conversation between the writer and N.Y. Parole Board Area Supervisor for
Buffalo on Jan. 29, 1971.
69. "Where the disclosure of an informer's identity, or the contents of his com-
munication, is relevant and helpful to the defense of the accused, or is essential to a
fair determination of a cause, the [informer's] privilege must give way." Roviaro v.
United States, 353 U.S. 53, 60-61 (1957).
70. Certain principles have remained relatively immutable in our jurisprudence.
One of these is that where governmental action seriously injures an
individual, and the reasonableness of the actions depends on fact findings,
the evidence used to prove the Government's case must be disclosed to
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biases which affect their professional decisions.71 At the very minimum,
the officer who prepared the report would have to be available for ques-
tioning. Such a practice will not only protract the proceedings but also
will take the officer away from his supervisory duties.72 Thus the parole
system may be placed in a situation where it is faced on one hand with a
course of action inconsistent with the intent of the court or, on the other,
it may have to comply with procedural rights that cannot coexist with
parole practices. It does not appear to be possible to provide revocation
hearings that are at once speedy and effective. A semblance of compliance
with the court's order would appear to mandate at the very minimum a
drastic increase in the manpower of the parole system-both at the parole
board level and at the supervisory level. 73
Furthermore, it seems inescapable that, having provided for an ad-
versarial proceeding on factual questions, some mechanism for review of
the ultimate determination must be made available. For example, it is not
clear precisely what constitutes "consorting." Thus even if it is factually
established that a parolee was in the company of persons with criminal
records, is this sufficient to establish a charge of "consorting" as a matter
of law? It would seem that this is precisely the type of issue that should
be reviewable. This, of course, would necessitate an identifiable standard
of proof at the revocation proceeding-such as the preponderance of the
evidence test used in civil cases. 74
the individual so that he has an opportunity to show that it is untrue.
While this is important in the case of documentary evidence, it is even
more important where the evidence consists of the testimony of indi-
viduals whose memory might be faulty or who, in fact, might be per-
jurers or persons motivated by malice, vindictiveness, intolerance, prejudice,
or jealousy.
Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496 (1958).
71. 4 ATrORNEY GENERAL SURVEY OF RELES PRocEDuREs 246-47 (1939).
72. See Note, Parole Revocation in the Federal System, 56 GEo. LJ. 705, 726
(1968) ; Kadish, supra note 12, at 837.
73. In 1969, 3,192 parolees were declared delinquent and after revocation hearings
2,299 were returned to correctional institutions as parole violators. STATE OF NEW
YoRK FAcTS AND FIGURES ABOUT THE Acrivrnss OF THE BOARD OF PAROLE AND THE Divi-
SION OF PAROLE OF THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT 20 (1969). This figure represents
revocation hearings alone. The number of release hearings are somewhat higher. The
present twelve-man Board which must sit in panels of three cannot devote more than
a few minutes to each hearing. Implicit in the right to counsel are longer hearings.
The experience under the Combs decision bears this out. One hearing in Auburn
Prison in which a parolee was represented by counsel lasted over three hours and the
attorney reportedly complained bitterly to the Division of Parole in Albany that he
was not given an adequate opportunity to defend his client! This episode was recounted
in the conversation referred to in supra note 68.
74. 27 N.Y.2d at 395, 267 N.E.2d at 249, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 464 (Breitel J., dissenting).
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The court also does not specify at what point the revocation hearing
must take place. In People ex rel. Johnson v. Follette75 parole revocation
procedures were explained:
The parole violation procedure is set in motion by the filing of
a written violation report by a parole officer that contains allega-
tions 'proven and supported with the same thoroughness which
is used in obtaining evidence for legal action.' Before the report
is submitted, the parolee's statement is taken and included. The
report is then submitted to a member of the board [in Albany]
who determines whether a return or a detainer warrant should
issue and upon the issuance of the warrant the parolee is declared
delinquent.t 761 Revocation hearings before members of the board
are determined on the basis of the violation report and an appear-
ance by the parolee. Upon the information supplied the board
may make its determination or order a further investigation and
report.77
This would indicate that the revocation hearing be held in the correctional
institution where the parolee may remain incarcerated for as long as a
month before being heard on the issue of his violation. Continuing such
a practice appears to be inconsistent with the court's decision, especially
since such a deprivation of liberty is no longer justifiable as a withdrawal
of a mere privilege.78 Furthermore, although the court talks generally of
parole revocation hearings, the thrust of its opinion is directed to improper
deprivations of liberty.79 It would follow then that either the revocation
hearing must be held at a point in time earlier -than that indicated in
Johnson or that some provision be made to permit the parolee to remain
at liberty until the hearing is held and the fact of the violation of parole
properly established.8 0 Complying with the former alternative would work
75. 58 Misc. 2d 474, 295 N.Y.S.2d 565 (Sup. Ct. 1968).
76. At this point he is usually transferred from the local jaiI to a correctional
institution. The Parole Board panel of three members usually meets and holds hearings
at the correctional institution. N.Y. CoaR. LAW § 218 (McKinney 1968). Hearings are
usually held once a month. See generally N.Y. CORR. LAW, §§ 216-18 (McKinney 1968).
77. 58 Misc. 2d 474, 477-78, 295 N.Y.S.2d 565, 570 (Sup. Ct. 1968) (citations
omitted).
78. 27 N.Y.2d at 384, 267 N.E.2d at 242, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 455.
79. Id. at 381-82, 267 N.E.2d at 241-42, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 453-54.
80. In order that the period between retaking and the revocation hearing be
of value to the parolee in preparing his defense, he should be given the
right to release in his own recognizance when a technical violation is
alleged. If the alleged violation has also been the subject of a criminal
charge, the Board should not interfere with such bail arrangements as
have been made by the court before whom the parolee has been arraigned.
Note, Parole Revocation in the Federal System, 56 GEo. L.J. 705, 739 (1968). California
has experimented with a system of bail release and release on recognizance of selected
parolees. See ANNUAL REsEARcH Ri nvw, CAuFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS 36
(1969). See also G. GRDmNi, THE PARoLE PRocEss 255 (1959) :
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a severe hardship on the present twelve-man Parole Board.81 Holding
revocation hearings at the prison is convenient because the number of
venues is limited and because release hearings are held at the same loca-
tion. If revocation hearings were to be held before the parolees were sent
to prison, not only would the Board have to continue -to make their regu-
lar trips to the prison to hold release hearings but they would also have
the impossible task of holding revocation hearings in cities across the state.
Continuing to hold revocation hearings at the prison has other dis-
advantages for indigent parolees. The court grants the parolee the right to
call witnesses, 82 but unless the Board allows him to fully utilize its power
of compulsory process, he will be forced to rely on voluntary witnesses.83
To the indigent unable to pay witness fees and transportation costs to and
from the location of the hearing, especially if it is a distant correctional
institution, the opportunity to produce credible voluntary witnesses may
thus be made illusory. Here again the Board is confronted with a choice
of equally unattractive options-granting compulsory process and thus un-
dermining its system of information 84 or withholding the power and thus
providing an ineffective hearing.
The right to counsel probably cannot be fully implemented without
legislative action. 85 Parole boards as administrative agencies generally lack
the power to appoint counsel,8 6 and courts generally have no jurisdiction
Parolees are frequently prevented from obtaining bail by parole authorities
by detainers lodged against them following arrest for a new offense. It is
usually assumed that, if a parolee is charged with a new offense, he has
probably violated his parole in some way. Furthermore, the legal status of a
parolee may not be regarded as the same as that of a person who is not
on parole. A parolee is still under sentence and, therefore, may not have
the same rights and privileges as a free person. . . . However, parolees
arrested for new offenses frequently request release on bail. If the Bill of
Rights holds for parolees as for other persons, it seems that the only safe
basis for refusing release on bond would be proof that the parolee has
violated his parole in ways other than are indicated by the charges for
which he was arrested and for which he is yet to be found guilty.
Id.
81. See text of supra note 73.
82. 27 N.Y.2d at 384, 267 N.E.2d at 242, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 455.
83. See, e.g., Boddie v. Weakley, 356 F.2d 242 (4th Cir. 1966); Barnes v. Reed,
301 F.2d 516 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Reed v. Butterworth, 297 F.2d 776 (D.C. Cir. 1961);
Martin v. Board of Parole, 199 F. Supp. 542 (D.D.C. 1961); Riggins v. Rhay, 75 Wash. 2d
271, 450 P.2d 806 (1969).
84. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
85. Unquestionably, the constitutional right to counsel granted by the instant
case extends to indigents. Cf. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); Gideon v. Wain-
wright, 372 US. 335 (1963); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) ; Lane v. Brown,
372 U.S. 477 (1963). See also Earnest v. Willingham, 406 F.2d 681 (10th Cir. 1969).
86. Jacob and Sharma, Justice after Trial: Prisoner's Need for Legal Services in
the Criminal Correctional Process, 18 KAN. L. Rav. 493, 544 (1970).
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to appoint counsel to represent an indigent who faces possible parole re-
vocation. s7 The court's power appears limited to setting aside the parole
board decision, on review, for failure to provide counsel to the indigent
parolee.SS Legislative action, for example, could take the form of either
extending the function of the public defender to representation of in-
digents at parole revocation hearings89 or appropriating money to create
a fund to be used by the Parole Board to hire counsel for indigents.09 The
dissenting opinion 91 points out that the decision will have to be applied
retroactively since it "affects, and is justified only because it affects, the
integrity of the fact-finding process." 92 The additional burdens thus im-
posed on the Parole Board are apparent.93
The court's emphasis in the instant case on the importance of fact-
finding where the status of a person caught up in the correctional system
is substantially affected has major significance not limited to the specific
facts of this case. Insofar as parole release is denied solely because the
Board is convinced of a certain fact (e.g., that the prisoner is a klepto-
manic or has homicidal tendencies) it would follow that the same interests
in a reliable fact-finding process are present even though there is no pres.
87. Id.
88. Id. Cf. People ex rel. Combs v. LaVallee, 29 App. Div. 2d 128, 286 NY.S.2d 600
(4th Dep't), appeal dismissed, 22 N.Y.2d 857, 293 N.Y.S.2d 117 (1968).
89. Cf. Commonwealth ex rel. Patterson v. Pa. Bd. of Probation and Parole, 215
Pa. Super. 532, 258 A.2d 693 (1969). Advanced law students working under careful
supervision could be effectively utilized.
90. See generally Jacob and Sharma, supra note 86, at 545-46. It is interesting to
consider if the right to appointed counsel would exist had the court avoided the
constitutional issue and arrived at its decision by reading into the statutory right of an
"opportunity to appear" (N.Y. CoRR. LAW § 218 (McKinney 1968)) the right to counsel.
See cases cited in supra notes 21 and 28.
91. 27 N.Y.2d at 395, 267 N.E.2d at 250, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 465 (Breitel J., dissenting).
92. I& See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 639 (1965). But see Murray v.
Page, 429 F.2d 1359 (10th Cir. 1970).
The right to appear and be heard at a parole revocation hearing is minimal,
not to be compared to the elaborate protections afforded the criminally
accused. And at this late date we do not believe the administration of justice
would be best served by now imposing perhaps an insurmountable burden of
conducting revocation hearings years after the decision to revoke has been
made.
Id. at 1362-63. On the retroactivity issue see generally Desist v. United States, 394 U.S.
244 (1969).
93. Murray v. Page, 429 F.2d 1359, 1362-63 (10th Cir. 1970). The Chairman of
the Parole Board, Paul J. Regan, in a letter to the writer dated March 15, 1971, stated
that he anticipates litigation of the retroactivity issue since "the retroactive application
of the decision would place an almost impossible burden on us." A recent case, People
ex rel. Fuca v. Department of Correction, .... Misc. 2d ........ N.Y.S.2d .... (Sup Ct.
Dutchess Cty., February 23, 1971), held, per Hawkins, J., that the instant decision is
to be accorded prospective application only. On the other hand, Judge John S. Conable
of the Wyoming County Court, in a conversation with the writer on March 22, 1971,
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ently enjoyed liberty.9 4 The decision may also have an impact on prison
disciplinary hearings where a violation of major proportions is alleged
and where the prisoner is deprived of the "liberty" of mingling with the
general prison population and is confined in an isolated cell block (prison
within a prison) for a substantial period of time. Here again it would
seem that notions of due process are equally applicable, especially since
such hearings may result in actually increasing the effective length of the
prisoner's sentence through loss of "good time" which he would otherwise
earn.
Inspite of the seemingly insurmountable burdens and procedural diffi-
culties imposed on the parole system by the instant decision, it is difficult
to dispute the inherent logic of the court's argument and the justice of its
position. Nothing rankles in the human breast more than a sense of in-
justice. Procedural fairness has for too long a time been sacrified on the
altar of expedience. By acting to reverse the order of priorities in some
measure the court has perhaps taken a step that not only will guarantee
a greater measure of justice in the correctional process but may also have
the welcome side effect of creating an atmosphere conducive to real re-
habilitation.
CLARENCE J. SUNDRAM
EVIDENCE-COCONSPIRATOR RULE ALLOWING ADMISSION OF ACCOM-
PLICE'S DECLARATION HELD NOT VIoLATIVE OF SixTH AMENDMENT RIGHT
OF CONFRONTATION
Discovery of the handcuffed, bullet-riddled bodies of three police offi-
cers led to the arrest of appellee Evans, and two suspected accomplices,
Williams and Truett. Charged with murder, Evans pleaded not guilty and
asked to be tried separately. Truett was granted immunity from prosecu-
tion in return for his testimony as a State's witness. The case came before
the Supreme Court on appeal after the United States' Court of Appeals for
-the Fifth Circuit reversed the denial of a writ of habeus corpus by the
United States District Court of Georgia.' Truett, the prosecution's chief
witness testified that he, appellee and Williams were accosted by the police-
men while changing the license plates on a stolen car. As one of the officers
was searching the automobile, Evans grabbed his firearm, disarmed the
stated that the retroactive application of the decision is mandated since it is a consti-
tutional decision. Inmates of the Attica Correctional Facility have been granted retro-
active application of the Menechino decision.
94. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected the notion that counsel
should be permitted in parole release hearings. Menechino v. Oswald, 430 F.2d 403,
410 (2d Cir. 1970).
1. Evans v. Dutton, 400 F.2d 826 (5th Cir. 1968).
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